

Research Article

Policy Capacity Within the Local Anticorruption Political Agenda (A Study of Corruption Prevention in the Post-Covid-19 Economic Recovery Program in Malang City)

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Abstract.

This research aims to assess the local government's capacity to develop anti-corruption policies for social assistance programs (Bansos) and post-Covid-19 economic recovery. The study examines deeply the effectiveness of the policy framework in combatting corruption at the local level. The research findings are intended to form the keystone for crafting regional anti-corruption policy strategies, particularly focusing on preventing corruption in social assistance funds during the Covid-19 pandemic. The research location chosen is the Government of Malang City, given the occurrence of widespread corruption within the local government in 2018 (<https://antikorupsi.org/id/article/korupsi-massal-wakil-rakyat-daerah>). Have there been systematic efforts to enhance corruption prevention? This research was conducted between 2021 and 2022 during the economic recovery period following the Covid-19 pandemic, utilizing document analysis, mass media reports, and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Employing content analysis and qualitative methods, this study highlights the necessity for innovative approaches to strengthen corruption prevention and eradication policy capabilities. While there is a commitment from local governments, concrete programs and action plans are still needed. Moreover, stricter mechanisms and enhanced oversights are essential to bolster corruption prevention.

Keywords: corruption prevention, local government policy, policy capacity, economic recovery

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1. Introduction

The issue of preventing and addressing corruption in the context of economic recovery following the Covid-19 pandemic has sparked significant debate, primarily due to a sting operation conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) targeting Juliari P. Batubara, the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Juliari P. Batubara was arrested as a suspect in a case involving alleged bribery related to the procurement of goods and services within the Ministry of Social Affairs, specifically concerning the Covid-19 social assistance (Bansos) program in the Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Jabodetabek) regions in 2020. During this sting operation (OTT), the KPK


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confiscated a total of IDR 14.5 billion in cash, comprising three currencies: IDR 11.9 billion, USD 171,085, and SGD 23,000 [1]

Juliari P. Batubara (JPB) was found to have violated Article 12, subparagraphs a or b, or Article 11 of Law Number 31 Year 1999, which pertains to the Eradication of Corruption Crimes (Tipikor), as amended by Law Number 20 Year 2001 concerning Amendments to Law Number 31 Year 1999 regarding the Eradication of Corruption Crimes, in conjunction with Article 55, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code. In this case, individuals involved in corruption related to disaster relief funds, including the Covid-19 pandemic social assistance (Bansos), could potentially face the death penalty, in accordance with the statement by Firli Bahuri, the Chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), based on Article 2 of Law 31 Year 1999, which stipulates, “Anyone who intentionally enriches themselves or others, unlawfully causing financial losses to the state as described in paragraph 2, may be subject to the death penalty” [2].

The polemic surrounding current corruption cases demands significant attention within the context of corruption prevention and management in Indonesia, particularly concerning the enforcement of laws against corrupt individuals. Previous research, as highlighted by Zauhar, has revealed a notable and substantial increase in corruption cases in Indonesia. These cases are particularly pronounced in regional areas, notably during pivotal political events like regional elections (Pemilukada). The research findings indicate a consistent pattern of rising corruption cases accompanying these political events. Given this, it is imperative and highly pertinent for local governments to prioritize addressing the surge in corruption cases within their regions as a pivotal element of their corruption prevention and management efforts. This should involve a specific emphasis on combatting corruption offenses as a primary policy agenda at the local level.

Observations conducted by the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) illustrate that the handling of corruption cases by law enforcement agencies has exhibited fluctuations between the first half of 2018 and the first half of 2022. See the graph ICW [3]



Source: ICW (2023)

Figure 1: Graph of Corruption Data for 2016-2022.

Similar fluctuations are observed regarding the individuals designated as suspects. However, the total estimated loss to the state, as evaluated by the Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK) and/or the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan or BPKP), has shown an upward trend. These observations suggest that the government has yet to achieve optimal results in curbing corrupt practices effectively.

Corruption offenses have a strong connection to both national and local events. An intriguing statement by Ipi Maryati Kuding, the Acting Spokesperson of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the Prevention Division, on August 18, 2020, highlighted the potential for corruption in Covid-19 social assistance (Bansos) programs due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Klitgaard underscores that anti-corruption strategies are geared towards reinforcing public accountability and promoting citizen participation in monitoring government performance, particularly in the allocation of budgets for Covid-19 social assistance (Bansos). In the implementation of Bansos, the KPK identified four issues associated with the distribution process: inaccuracies in identifying recipients, suboptimal coordination and regulation among organizations managing aid, delays and misuse in aid distribution, and a deficiency in accountability and support.

The central strategy for addressing and preventing corruption cases in Covid-19 social assistance (Bansos) programs, both at the national and regional levels, should encompass the full engagement of all stakeholders. In particular, local governments should prioritize addressing corruption concerns in their regions as pivotal issues and political agendas within their policy frameworks. As articulated by Rose-Ackerman, corruption is not a challenge that can be effectively tackled in isolation. Relying solely on criminal law to pursue and punish wrongdoers is insufficient. Instead, the state must build credibility by penalizing corrupt officials who attract public attention. However, the objective of such prosecution is to raise awareness and garner public support rather than addressing the root causes of corruption. According to her, there is no one straightforward approach that can be applied universally.

Rose-Ackerman emphasizes the necessity of implementing policies that enhance transparency and accountability in government operations while also facilitating the existence of independent oversight organizations. Achieving substantial changes demands unwavering commitment from the highest echelons of government and a resolute dedication to persist in anti-corruption endeavors. One of the core challenges in preventing and eliminating corruption at the local level, particularly in the allocation of social assistance (Bansos) funds during the Covid-19 pandemic, pertains to the absence

of concurrent anti-corruption policies aligned with the political determination of local authorities. The current anti-corruption policy for social assistance funding (Bansos) remains predominantly top-down, and the supervision of budget utilization is closely interlinked with the roles of institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and the mass media. These entities play a pivotal role in scrutinizing the Covid-19 social assistance budget, a subject inherently infused with political dimensions.

Tackling corruption as a systemic problem calls for a thorough and unified approach. Experts have put forth a range of strategies and approaches to combat corruption, encompassing both theoretical and practical dimensions. These anti-corruption strategies revolve around institutional reforms, enhancing accountability, and empowering society to oversee government corruption. As per Hylton and Young, the fight against corruption involves more than just enacting laws against corrupt behavior; it also entails various additional endeavors, which are delineated below:

“It is also necessary to seek to prevent corruption within the public sector by managing conflicts of interest, setting up mechanisms to provide for greater accountability regarding the use of public resources, providing an avenue for persons to report acts of corruption and setting up mechanisms for greater transparency and public participation”.

Local governments, in their endeavor to address and prevent corruption cases within the Covid-19 social assistance (Bansos) budget, should establish a comprehensive anti-corruption policy as their primary focus. So far, local governments have not optimally succeeded in their anti-corruption endeavors. Assessing the success and failures of anti-corruption measures, along with comprehending the steps taken by local governments to prevent and manage corruption cases linked to the Covid-19 social assistance budget, is of paramount importance. Furthermore, understanding how local governments elevate the issue of corruption in their regions to the status of a political policy agenda, necessitating a comprehensive and integrated anti-corruption strategy within the implementation of the Covid-19 social assistance (Bansos) budget distribution, is crucial. As a result, the research questions for this study are as follows:

1. What is the mechanism of anti-corruption policy capacity in the social assistance (Bansos) Covid-19 program and economic recovery implemented by local governments?
2. How far does the capacity of anti-corruption policy in the social assistance (Bansos) Covid-19 program and economic recovery become a commitment of local governments as a political agenda?

Policy concerns the actions taken by the government. According to Dye [4]), public policy can be defined as “whatever government chooses to do or not to do.” Essentially, it reflects the government’s decisions on what actions to undertake or avoid. Anderson [5] shares a similar perspective, defining public policy as “the choices made by the government on whether to engage in specific actions or abstain from them.” Moreover, according to Anderson, as cited in Hill and Hupe, public policy refers to the regulations and directives formulated by government officials and agencies. These definitions provided by both Dye and Anderson emphasize that public policy goes beyond the mere scope of government capabilities; it encompasses activities designed to address public interests. Fundamentally, policies are regarded as a set of actions intended to achieve a range of purposes and objectives. The direction of public policy is often indicated by the decisions made by government officials or agents. Policy, seen as a course of action according to Friedrich’s perspective as cited by Anderson [5], is designed to achieve a multitude of goals and objectives. However, understanding the government’s intentions and aims may not always be straightforward. The direction of public policy can typically be deciphered through government officials or agents.

Policy is woven from three primary components: society, the political system, and public policy itself, with each component significantly impacting the others. In the context of examining public policy within the United States, Thomas R. Dye [4] elucidates the interconnectedness of these elements, which encompass institutions, processes, behaviors; social and economic conditions; and public policy.

In the context of this study, the formulation of political agendas and policies represents a profoundly strategic process within the reality of public policy. This process harbors a space where the definition of a public issue and its standing in the political agenda become subjects of contention. It delves into why certain concerns make their way onto the government’s agenda while others remain unaddressed. Dye, as cited by Widodo [6], encapsulates agenda setting as “who decides what will be decided.” Not all public problems can be elevated to the status of policy problems. To effectively address public problems through public policy, these concerns must be transmuted into policy issues. This transformative process is known as agenda setting. Consequently, agenda setting encompasses policy issues that necessitate a response from the political system, stemming from the surrounding environment [6] Jones, as cited by [6] defines the agenda as “a term commonly used to portray those issues judged to require public action.” Therefore, in the process of agenda setting, policy issues emerge as a result of divergent perspectives among the actors regarding the course the government should

pursue. These policy issues arise due to conflicts or “variances in perception” among the actors or as a response to a societal predicament at a given time.

According to John W. Kingdon, the agenda-setting stage involves three streams: the problem stream, policy stream, and political stream [7]. The problem stream interprets and selects issues that the government considers as new challenges requiring resolution. Within the policy stream, potential alternatives or solutions to these issues are formulated. The policy stream subsequently processes these problems through political forces to establish them as a policy agenda. These three streams intersect when a policy window opens, and this convergence is organized by those possessing the necessary capabilities and resources, often referred to as policy entrepreneurs. Through these three streams, issues undergo a transformation process to become public policy.

Regarding the policy capacity perspective within the political agenda, it utilizes the model developed by Wu et al. [8]. From the government’s standpoint, policy capacity, as defined by Wu, encompasses the government’s ability to create superior alternatives [9], to monitor the environment and devise strategies [10]; [11], to evaluate and assess the impacts of policy decisions [12], and to effectively harness knowledge in policy formulation [13]. Fellegi [14] provides a comprehensive concept of policy capacity, encompassing the nature and quality of the potential resources used for policy assessment, formulation, and implementation, as well as the practices and procedures by which these resources are optimized and utilized for the benefit of public service, the non-governmental sector, and society at large.

<i>Levels of Resources and Capabilities</i>	<i>Skills and Competences</i>		
	<i>Analytical</i>	<i>Operational</i>	<i>Political</i>
Individual	Individual Analytical Capacity	Individual Operational Capacity	Individual Political Capacity
Organizational	Organizational Analytical Capacity	Organizational Operational Capacity	Organizational Political Capacity
Systemic	Systemic Analytical Capacity	Systemic Operational Capacity	Systemic Political Capacity

Adapted from Wu et al. (2018)

Figure 2: Policy Capacity: Skill and Competences.

Policy capacity is a combination of skills and existing resources. At the policy level, analytical capacity ensures that policy actions can technically contribute to achieving objectives when executed correctly. Operational capacity ensures that resources are aligned with policy actions, making them implementable in practice. Political capacity helps gain and maintain political support for policy actions [8] [15]; [16]; [17]. Although

political, analytical, and operational capacities are interrelated, they are regulated by different provisions and serve distinct purposes in the policy process. The success of an action doesn't demand all capacities equally; certain capacities hold more importance than others, a flexibility acknowledged within this framework [10] Therefore, categorization significantly aids in translating the concept of policy capacity into practical implementation. Enhancing these competencies involves different processes and considerations, and this diversity would be lost if any of the three core capacities were disregarded or combined inadequately.

Effective policy design involves technical knowledge for practical policy analysis, the ability to disseminate knowledge, and leadership and negotiation skills at the individual level. At the government organization level, mobilizing information for timely policy analysis, administrative resources for coordination, and political support are fundamental for building comprehensive policy capacity. At the system level, institutions are needed to create and use knowledge, implement mechanisms for coordination, and foster political trust and legitimacy [10] At the system level, assessing analytical capacity involves measuring the extent and quality of data collection across the system, the accessibility and efficiency of stakeholder involvement in the policy process, and the degree of competition and diversity in the production of policy knowledge.

At the system level, operational capacity involves overseeing public sector institutions and their interactions with community partners. Firstly, it encompasses coordinating efforts between-governments and between-institutions, focusing on policy integration to address cross-sectoral issues that go beyond the individual responsibilities of each organization. This involves managing policies responsively within specific sectors. Secondly, establishing robust relationships and engagement within the policy chain and the community is vital for operational capacity. Many sources emphasize that to tackle complex public challenges, public institutions need strong partnerships and collaborations within the public sector. Strong institutional relationships lead to better decision-making and implementation [18]. Thirdly, the primary operational capacity at the systemic level requires clear delineation of roles, functions, and accountability of various organizations in the policy process. Within the legal and political framework, public sector institutions not only have the freedom to execute their functions but also play a role in overseeing this freedom to ensure impartial governance. Rothstein et al. regard the enforcement of the principle of impartiality as a measure of government capacity. Enforcing accountability, legal processes, and adherence to the rule of law in public sector institutions not only uphold the principles of liberalism and democracy but also enhance government performance. Essential elements of good governance include public sector institutions

taking responsibility for decisions and actions within executive institutions, partners, and the community.

Lastly, at the system level, policy capacity is determined by the ability and competence of stakeholders in policy processes to maintain public support for policy reform and resolve conflicts arising from policy actions. First, the level of political accountability and policy legitimacy [19]. A policy system with a high level of political capacity ensures that the failure of policies can be identified by all parties, and those responsible for making and implementing policies can be held accountable without violating the fundamental principles of governance. Civil society, independent media, and freedom of speech, assembly, and association play important roles in enhancing political accountability [20]. Secondly, the level of trust in the government. A government with high levels of trust and legitimacy from the public is expected to be effective.

Effective design, in essence, ensures that policy instruments are anticipated to be consistent with governance regulations while providing means to achieve policy objectives. A design with the ability to support policy instrument design indicates an environment marked by high analytical, operational, and political capacities [21]; [22]). The capacity required to develop politics and administration for policy design processes is a subject of great interest. To address this, policy design must understand the internal mechanisms of government and the policy sector, as constituents can enhance or weaken their ability to think systematically about policies and develop effective policies.

Organizations and individual policymakers depend on political support stemming from the policy-making environment they operate within. Therefore, they derive legitimacy and authority from the systemic-level political capacity, which, in turn, fosters a conducive environment for applying individual and organizational political capacities during the design process [23]; [24]. Political support for policymakers and the interactions between policymakers and politicians are considered indispensable for addressing ambiguous goals and enhancing managerial effectiveness. These interactions provide organizations with a clearer understanding of their overall mandate [25]; [26]

At the individual and organizational levels, political capacity plays a pivotal role in navigating effectively within the design space [27]. It is most evident in the form of trust levels, particularly political trust and legitimacy in the public sector. Political, individual, and organizational capacities are also needed to gain support from key stakeholders, both before and during the design process, as well as in the upcoming policy implementation phase [28]. The effectiveness of instruments and how they are assessed hinges on three factors. First, the extent to which substantive policy instruments are bolstered by procedural policy instruments. Second, the degree to which critical institutional

prerequisites, conditioning the performance of these instruments, are incorporated in the policy. Third, the extent to which specific elements of the instrument or the outcomes of its evaluation can be adjusted in both the short and long term.

Effective spatial design reviews implicitly treat capacity types as an independent variable that determines policy outcomes. However, our understanding of how capacity is related to the concept of effectiveness, and the causal mechanisms that underlie this relationship, are not always clear. In other words, policy capacity can be multidimensional, with emerging interactions between basic capacity at the first level and more aspirational capacity at the second level. Lodhi [29] and Hartley and Zhang [27] provide recommendations for a comprehensive measurement of policy capacity. These steps can yield various levels of capacity, enabling to better observe and understand the relationships between them. The emphasis is on how policy capacity at one level can either enhance or constrain capacity at the other two levels, a factor that is often overlooked when conceptualizing the relationship between policy capacity and the effectiveness of policy design.

In this review, the study primarily focuses on the operationalization of specific types of capacity rather than exploring how the relationship or interaction between various capacity types influences policy outcomes. When systemic-level policy capacity is high, but individual policy capacity cannot support organizational policy capacity, it may suggest suboptimal design. Such cases indicate that we might sometimes perceive the existence of policy capacity at the systemic level as hindering the mobilization of organizational and/or individual policy capacity. However, it is crucial to recognize that the dynamics are equally essential for effective policy design. Moreover, although many scholars emphasize the significance of political capacity over operational and analytical capacity, they have not sufficiently developed propositions that can logically explain the importance of these capacities. This gap, in the next stage, may impede progress in understanding how the hierarchy and specific types of capacity can elucidate and lead to effective design.

2. Methods

This research used a qualitative approach, specifically adopting a phenomenological perspective, to explore the following key aspects:

1. The scope of the policy capacity mechanisms for corruption prevention in the Covid-19 social assistance program (Bansos).

2. The mechanisms for formulating policy capacity for corruption prevention in the Covid-19 social assistance program (Bansos) and economic recovery as a political agenda.

The chosen research location for this study is the Government of Malang City. Data analysis was conducted through a qualitative approach based on the Creswell model. Data collection methods involved the use of focus group discussions (FGD).

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Scope of The Policy Capacity Mechanisms for Corruption Prevention in the Covid-19 Social Assistance Program

One of the manifestations of policy capacity mechanisms and the individual, organizational, and systemic commitment of the Malang City Government to addressing the Covid-19 issue is the establishment of the Covid-19 Handling Task Force Team in Malang City. This commitment is seamlessly integrated into economic recovery efforts. Specifically, the economic recovery efforts by the Malang City Government encompass the provision of social assistance (Bansos) targeted at specific beneficiary groups. The social assistance provided by the government to revive the community's economy through the National Economic Recovery Program (PEN) in the form of cash aid, basic necessities, support for small and medium-sized enterprises (UMKM), and electricity tariff discounts. These measures were distributed from April to December 2020 (antaranews.com, September 13, 2020).

The findings of the focus group discussions (FGD) indicate that the responsibility for managing and implementing this social assistance program falls under the Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Education and Culture, and the Department of Transportation. The Department of Social Affairs' response to the Covid-19 pandemic involves providing social assistance to the community based on data from the Pre-Prosperous Family and Family Hope Program (PKH). Similarly, the Department of Education and Culture in Malang City redirected funds from the local budget (APBD) to offer social assistance to school canteen traders and artists. This initiative has been ongoing since April and involves distributing Rp 300,000 to each affected individual for three periods, totaling approximately Rp 1,126,200,000. Furthermore, the Department of Transportation's social assistance policy extends support to public transport drivers and parking attendants residing in Malang City. These measures were implemented even before the imposition of Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB), and assistance has

already been distributed to 996 public transport drivers and 2,207 parking attendants in Malang City. Additionally, social assistance is provided to traders by the Department of Cooperatives, Industry, and Commerce.

From an organizational perspective, the commitment of the Malang City Government to economic recovery includes empowering startups, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (IKM and UKM) in Malang City through a combination of online and offline support, promotion, and endorsement efforts. The “IKM and UKM Resurgence” initiative is a crucial component that demands attention from the Malang City Government to stimulate the local economy.

From a systemic perspective, there is currently a lack of integration in the handling of Covid-19 social assistance programs among various Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPDs). The government, which serves as the provider of protection, and the OPDs responsible for health, education, economics, and culture all operate independently, while ideally, they should work in collaboration. The potential for corruption does not only stem from fraudulent budget allocation but also from incorrect targeting in aid distribution. For instance, situations where a single family receives three different types of assistance from various programs can lead to problems. The primary issues frequently encountered when the government provides social assistance are related to the accuracy of data, data updates, and the timing of distribution, which often lacks precision in both targeting and timing. Consequently, at the systemic level, policy capacity is contingent on the abilities and competencies of stakeholders in the policy process to maintain public support for policy reform and resolve conflicts arising from policy actions.

3.2. Mechanisms for Formulating Policy Capacity for Corruption Prevention in the Covid-19 Social Assistance (Bansos) Program and Economic Recovery

In formulating policy capacity for political, legal, and security (polhukam) development, attention is paid to developments both domestically and internationally. Several domestic issues that need to be anticipated in the coming five years include intolerance, procedural democracy, the complexity of bureaucratic services and law enforcement, corrupt behavior, potential security threats, and national sovereignty. At the global level, issues of concern include the depolarization of international political gravity, the shift of major-power competition to maritime arenas, deglobalization, and populism leading to unilateral policies by some countries, as well as instability in the Middle East.

The policy direction for political, legal, and security development is focused on five areas:

1. Democratic Consolidation
2. Optimization of Foreign Policy
3. Strengthening the National Legal System
4. Bureaucratic Reform and Governance
5. Strengthening National Security Stability

At the national level, Indonesia's policy and development system faces several challenges, including issues related to procedural democracy, the complexity of bureaucratic services and law enforcement, corrupt behavior, potential threats to national sovereignty, and the increasing tendency of transnational crimes. Legal development issues currently include an excessive number of regulations (hyper-regulation), overlapping, inconsistency, multiple interpretations, and disharmony that contribute to legal uncertainty. On the other hand, the judicial system, both in criminal and civil matters, has not optimally provided legal certainty and increased public trust. The current criminal justice system tends to have a negative impact, evident in the overcrowding of correctional facilities, exceeding their capacity by 103 percent. Furthermore, law enforcement in the post-revision of the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) Act has experienced failures due to structural institutional dysfunctions and a lack of collaboration among law enforcement agencies. As a result, policy capacity for law enforcement remains sectoral within each legal institution.

3.3. Policy Capacity Response to Corruption Prevention in the Post-Covid-19 Economic Recovery in Malang City

The Covid-19 pandemic showed no signs of improvement, with reports indicating an increase in the number of positive cases. However, there was also optimism due to the growing number of recoveries. This social phenomenon extends beyond the rise in positive cases, encompassing various reactions from less concerned citizens and resulting in other phenomena. These include an increase in poverty, population mobility, and heightened vulnerability to criminal activities. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has identified four sectors prone to corruption in handling the Covid-19 pandemic. These sectors involve the procurement of goods/services, grants to the Covid-19 Task Force or local governments, reallocation of national/regional budgets, and the distribution of social assistance. Consequently, through the issuance of three circular letters, law enforcement agencies like the KPK have urged both central and regional

governments to prioritize transparency by disclosing to the public the reallocation and use of funds for managing Covid-19. This action necessitates local governments to commit to strengthening synergies and enhancing effectiveness in the prevention and eradication of corruption, particularly amidst the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Local governments must also pledge to develop innovative responses to Covid-19 in line with the principles of accountability. The policy capacity for economic recovery in response to the Covid-19 pandemic is not solely the responsibility of the central government but also falls within the purview of local governments. Local governments have proactively allocated funds for additional Direct Cash Assistance for Village Funds (BLT-DD). This assistance is directed towards healthcare, mitigating economic impacts to ensure business continuity, and providing a social safety net (JPS).

Malang City Government, for instance, has allocated a budget of IDR 124.752 billion for COVID-19 management since mid-July. This budget was allocated to healthcare handling (IDR 28.536 billion), social safety nets (IDR 26.244 billion), and unforeseen expenditures (IDR 69.972 billion) (<https://mediaindonesia.com>). However, it's crucial to acknowledge that there have been allegations of misappropriation of Covid-19 social assistance funds. From the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) study, the implementation of social assistance (Bansos) has revealed four recurring issues: inaccurate targeting, suboptimal coordination and regulations among aid management institutions, delays and mismanagement in aid distribution, and a lack of accountability and support. Despite the transformation in the form of Bansos regarding aid type, targeting, distribution models, and evaluation, these persistent issues continue to hinder the Bansos process. Procedures for addressing alleged misappropriation of Bansos funds are regulated in Article 385 of Law No. 23 Year 2014 on Regional Governments. Paragraph (1) states that the public may report allegations of misconduct by regional civil servants (ASN) to the Internal Government Supervision Apparatus (APIP) and/or law enforcement agencies. Subsequently, in the implementation of social assistance (Bansos), a study conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) identified four issues related to the process of providing Bansos: inaccuracies in targeting recipients, suboptimal coordination and regulations among aid management institutions, delays and misuse in aid distribution, and a lack of accountability and support. These four issues have persisted throughout the implementation of Bansos, despite changes in the form of aid, targeting, distribution models, and evaluation.

Local governments, particularly in Malang City, must pioneer innovative approaches to prevent and combat corruption effectively. Although the local government demonstrates commitment, the persistence of corruption in the region can be attributed

to the absence of concrete programs as a manifestation of the local government's commitment. Commitment alone is insufficient in the battle against corruption; it's imperative to have a well-defined action plan and a tangible mechanism for corruption prevention. Furthermore, enhanced oversight in corruption prevention is essential. The anti-corruption efforts at the local government level necessitate strong backing from all stakeholders, including governmental institutions, law enforcement, civil society organizations (CSOs), political parties, and the general public. Genuine commitment and collaboration among all relevant stakeholders are indispensable in ensuring that the fight against corruption encompasses not only direct law enforcement measures but also cultural and structural preventive strategies. The most crucial factor underscoring the importance of public participation in the primary strategy for sustained and comprehensive corruption eradication is to ensure that obstacles in governance implementation, which can contribute to a decline in public trust, are not exploited by corrupt individuals. Public participation is vital in the fight against corruption to prevent these individuals from taking advantage of governance-related challenges and undermining public trust. To achieve transparent governance and prevent corruption at the local government level, it is imperative to establish formal policies within the local government's coverage. These policies should be enshrined in local regulations that incorporate measures to expedite corruption prevention and eradication, aligning with the development goals outlined in the Medium-Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah or RPJMD) of the Malang City Government. Such formal policies are vital to mitigate corruption structurally and culturally within local government and realize a clean governance framework free of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) in alignment with the region's development objectives. This approach harnesses the available skills and resources. Analytical capacity underscores the technical aspect of policy actions, emphasizing that well-implemented policies can effectively contribute to policy objectives. Operational capacity ensures that resources are efficiently allocated to policy actions, facilitating their successful execution. Political capacity is instrumental in securing and sustaining political support for policy actions throughout the process ([8]; [15]; [16], [17]). Moreover, the transformation of an issue into a policy agenda involves a comprehensive analysis of how problems are developed, defined, formulated, and resolved, particularly in the context of corruption prevention and eradication within the district government in the post-Covid-19 pandemic era. Within this framework, the process of agenda setting encompasses three streams, as outlined by John W. Kingdon [30]: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. These streams collectively ensure that issues, specifically those related to preventing

corruption in the distribution of social assistance funds during the Covid-19 pandemic, undergo a structured process to ultimately become public policies aimed at addressing corruption at the local level.

In the problem stream, issues are identified and selected by the government as problems that require solutions to prevent corruption cases involving various stakeholders, including the executive, legislative, and private sector. The policy stream, on the other hand, focuses on crafting alternative solutions and responses to the identified problems. Finally, the political stream encompasses the process of deliberating and processing these issues involving political forces and relevant stakeholders to include them on the public policy agenda. The convergence of these three streams and the ensuing discussions occurs when a policy window opens, and these deliberations are steered by entities with the capacity and resources, often referred to as policy entrepreneurs, who play a pivotal role in transforming these discussions into actionable public policies.

4. Conclusion

The findings and analysis highlight the necessity for local governments, particularly in Malang City, to take innovative measures in their endeavors to prevent and eliminate corruption. Despite the demonstrated commitment of the local government, corruption continues to persist within the region, primarily due to the absence of concrete programs that translate the local government's commitments into action. In the battle against corruption, mere commitment is insufficient; what is paramount is the presence of well-defined action plans and effective mechanisms to combat corruption. Enhanced oversight in corruption prevention is also imperative.

To effectively combat corruption at the local government level, the actions taken require significant support from all stakeholders, including individuals, organizations, and systems. This support should encompass state institutions, law enforcement agencies, civil society organizations, political parties, and the general public. Genuine commitment and collaboration from all relevant parties are vital. Therefore, anti-corruption efforts should extend beyond direct law enforcement actions and incorporate preventive strategies that address both cultural and structural aspects. The key factor is the ongoing and comprehensive engagement of the public in the primary strategies for preventing and eradicating corruption. This ensures that governance challenges do not lead to declining public trust, which could be exploited by corrupt individuals. Hence, robust public participation plays a pivotal role in the battle against corruption and its prevention.

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